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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VONNIE LYNN HARKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44194
Canyon County Case No.
CR-2015-6056

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Harkins failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an underlying unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, upon her
guilty plea to battery upon a law enforcement officer?

Harkins Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A jury found Harkins guilty of battery upon a law enforcement officer and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, suspended
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the sentence, and placed Harkins on probation. (R., pp.98-101.) Harkins filed a notice
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.91-94.)
Harkins asserts her underlying sentence is excessive in light of her mental health
and substance abuse issues, because this is her first felony conviction, and because
she only touched the neck of, and did not actually injure, the officer whom she was
convicted of battering. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) The record supports the sentence
imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for battery upon a law enforcement officer is five
years. I.C. § 18-915. The district court imposed an underlying unified sentence of four
years, with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.98-
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101.) Contrary to Harkins’ assertions on appeal, her underlying sentence is reasonable
to achieve the goals of sentencing, particularly to protect the community and to facilitate
Harkins’ own rehabilitation.
Harkins’ conviction in this case stemmed from an incident in which she was
intoxicated and lunged at an officer who had been dispatched to a residence in
response to a “report of a disturbance and battery.” (PSI, p.3. 1) During the encounter,
Harkins told the officer “she was military, an undercover military police officer, and …
that she was the military general attorney for the world.” (PSI, p.3.) Harkins “became
very aggressive” while speaking with the officer and stated, “Answer my questions,
motherfucker, I am your commandin[g] officer, motherfucker.” (PSI, p.3.) Harkins “then
came off the steps and brought both hands up to [the officer’s] neck,” at which point the
officer “grabbed her arms and pushed her back into the door. They then both went to
the ground as [Harkins] continued to fight.” (PSI, p.3.) The officer eventually “gained
control” of Harkins and took her into custody. (PSI, p.3.)
At the time she committed the offense of which she was convicted in this case,
Harkins was on supervised probation in Owyhee County on a misdemeanor charge of
battery (reduced from felony aggravated battery). (PSI, p.10.) Harkins’ probation officer
“was not surprised to learn of the instant offense as she felt that [Harkins] was always
on the verge of snapping.”

(PSI, p.10.)

Harkins’ probation officer explained that

Harkins “was ‘normal’ during some visits, while in others she would have conversations
with herself, speak in code like a dispatcher and even refer to herself as different people
depending on the day.” (PSI, p.10.) Harkins was also noncompliant with the terms of
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All citations to “PSI” are to the Presentence Report dated 4/25/2016.
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her probation, as she tested positive for alcohol on all of her drug tests and had yet to
pay any restitution to her victim. (PSI, pp.10-11.) Harkins’ probation officer opined that
Harkins was “in need of incarceration,” as such “would be safer for the community and
for [Harkins].”
Following her arrest in this case, a mental health evaluator diagnosed Harkins
with “Psychotic Disorder NOS, due to the psychotic statements she had made.” (PSI,
p.17.)

The evaluator recommended that Harkins “receive medically monitored

treatment in a facility where psychiatric services could be provided for psychiatric
stabilization and reduction of risk to self and others.” (PSI, p.17.) Harkins subsequently
underwent an I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation and was deemed not competent to
proceed. (PSI, p.17.) Harkins was then admitted to State Hospital North (SHN), where
she “continued making delusional statements and was irritable.” (PSI, p.18.) She was
subsequently deemed competent and was discharged from SHN in March 2016 “with a
diagnosis of Schizophrenia and Traumatic Brian Injury.” (PSI, p.18.) When Harkins
was discharged from SHN she was taking medication for her psychosis and thought
disorder, but did not think she needed all of her medication because she did not think
she had Schizophrenia. (PSI, p.18.) It was recommended at the time of discharge that
Harkins receive multiple mental health services and counseling because she was still
considered a moderate risk for assault and could become gravely disabled if she were
to discontinue her medications. (PSI, p.18.)
In fashioning Harkins’ sentence, the district court specifically considered Harkins’
mental health conditions and the fact that Harkins committed her crime “in connection”
with her unmanaged mental health issues. (5/5/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.14-21.) The court
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recognized that, with treatment, Harkins would be “much less likely to commit a crime,”
and it determined that Harkins would benefit from participating in mental health court,
either as a formal member or as a condition of probation, so that Harkins would be
supervised and have access to mental health services. (5/5/16 Tr., p.22, L.20 – p.23,
L.13, p.27, Ls.3-15.) In light of Harkins’ mental health history, and her demonstrated
inability or unwillingness to manage her own mental health conditions, the underlying
unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, was not only reasonable, but was
also necessary to ensure Harkins’ compliance with any court ordered or prescribed
mental health regimens.
Harkins argues the underlying sentence is excessive because this was her first
felony conviction. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) She fails to mention, however, that has an
extensive misdemeanor record, which includes convictions for driving without
permission, possession of a controlled substance, possession of spice, open container,
disorderly conduct, battery (two convictions, one of which was amended from
aggravated battery), and cruelty to animals. (PSI, pp.5-10.) Harkins has also been
charged with leaving the scene of an accident, possession of a controlled substance,
battery, multiple injury to a child charges, and multiple domestic violence charges. (PSI,
pp.5-10.)

Her criminal history, which is undoubtedly related to her previously

unmanaged mental health conditions, supports the underlying sentence.
Harkins also maintains her sentence is excessive because she only touched the
neck of the officer during the altercation.

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

Such is neither

mitigating, nor a defense to the battery of which she was convicted in this case. Idaho
Code § 18-903(b) defines battery as the “actual, intentional and unlawful touching or
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striking of another person against the will of the other …” (emphasis added). In this
case, Harkins not only touched the neck of the officer against his will, but she continued
to fight the officer until she was handcuffed. (PSI, p.3.)
The district court considered all the relevant information and imposed a sentence
that is reasonable both to protect society and to further Harkins’ rehabilitation. Given
any reasonable view of the facts, Harkins has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Harkins’ conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 9th day of February, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming ________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of February, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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